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Medical science is typically pitted against the evolutionary forces acting upon infective populations
of bacteria. As an alternative strategy, we could exploit our growing understanding of popu-
lation dynamics of social traits in bacteria to help treat bacterial disease. In particular,
population dynamics of social traits could be exploited to introduce less virulent strains of
bacteria, or medically beneﬁcial alleles into infective populations. We discuss how bacterial
strains adopting different social strategies can invade a population of cooperative wild-type,
considering public good cheats, cheats carrying medically beneﬁcial alleles (Trojan horses)
and cheats carrying allelopathic traits (anti-competitor chemical bacteriocins or temperate
bacteriophage viruses). We suggest that exploitation of the ability of cheats to invade cooperative,
wild-type populations is a potential new strategy for treating bacterial disease.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Bacteria and other micro-organisms exhibit a wide
range of social behaviours. Technological advances
made by microbiologists have overturned the long
held assumption that micro-organisms live relatively
independent, unicellular lives. Instead, it appears that
individual cells can communicate and cooperate to
perform activities such as dispersal, foraging, con-
struction of bioﬁlms, reproduction, chemical warfare
and signalling (reviewed by Crespi 2001; Velicer
2003; Webb et al. 2003; Keller & Surette 2006;
Kolter & Greenberg 2006; West et al. 2006; Diggle
et al. 2007a; Foster 2007; Hense et al. 2007; West
et al. 2007a; Williams et al. 2007; Brown & Buckling
2008; MacLean 2008; Popat et al. 2008). These
social behaviours are comparable to the more familiar
patterns of sociality in metazoans such as social insects
and cooperative breeding vertebrates, discussed in the
other articles in this volume. Furthermore, these social
traits are critical to determining the damage caused by
microbial parasites to their hosts (virulence) due to
their importance for microbial growth.
However,evolutionarytheoryshowshowcooperation
is easily lost in competition against selﬁsh strategies
(Hamilton 1964; Trivers 1971). Consider a population
ofunconditionalcooperatorsinwhichanuncooperative,
relatively selﬁsh cheater arises through mutation or
migration. In the absence of any mechanism to punish
non-cooperators, the cheater beneﬁts from the
cooperative behaviour of its social partners, without
paying any cost. Consequently, genes for cheating have
greater ﬁtness than the genes for cooperation, and
spread through the population, even though this will
lead to a decline in population ﬁtness (ﬁgure 1). A
large body of theoretical and empirical work has
examined the conditions under which cooperation can
be favoured, via direct or indirect (kin selected) beneﬁts
(reviewed by Sachs et al.2 0 0 4 ; Lehmann & Keller 2006;
West et al. 2007b), and how this may be applied to
microbes (West et al.2 0 0 6 ).
Experimental studies using microbes show how
cheats can invade populations of wild-type cooperators
(Strassmann et al. 2000; Velicer et al. 2000; Greig &
Travisano 2004; Grifﬁn et al. 2004; Harrison et al.
2006; Diggle et al. 2007b; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007;
Sandoz et al. 2007; Ku ¨mmerli et al. 2009a,b;
Rumbaugh et al. 2009). The most common way for
microbes to cooperate with one another is by the
release of exoproducts, such as proteases and toxins,
that facilitate bacterial growth (West et al. 2007a).
Exoproducts can beneﬁt any individual in the local
group and so can be considered as public goods,
which can be exploited by cheats that do not produce
the exoproduct. Possibly, the best studied exoproducts
from a evolutionary perspective are iron-scavenging
siderophore molecules in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
(West & Buckling 2003). Mutants (cheats or
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to exploit those produced by others, and hence
increase in frequency in mixed populations that con-
tain both cooperators and cheats (Grifﬁn et al. 2004;
Harrison et al. 2006). Another layer of complexity is
that the release of many exoproducts is regulated in a
cell density-dependent manner via diffusible signal
molecules by a process that has been termed quorum
sensing (QS). Experimental studies in both laboratory
cultures and mouse hosts have shown that QS-
defective mutants, that do not signal or respond to
signal, are able to beneﬁt from public goods produced
by others and increase in frequency, even in conditions
where they would normally show only very limited
growth (Diggle et al. 2007b; Sandoz et al. 2007;
Rumbaugh et al. 2009).
Cooperative behaviours in bacteria are of particu-
lar interest because they are fundamental to the
success and virulence of bacterial infections. Exopro-
ducts are commonly referred to as ‘virulence factors’
because their production is associated with virulence,
either through direct damage to the host, or through
aiding bacterial growth (West et al. 2007a). Infections
containing mutants that do not produce exoproducts
are often characterized by lower virulence. For
example, QS has been demonstrated to be important
for virulence in several species of bacteria including
P . aeruginosa (Rumbaugh et al. 1999, 2009),
Burkholderia pseudomallei (Ulrich et al.2 0 0 4 ), Vibrio
cholerae (Lin et al.2 0 0 7 )a n dStaphylococcus aureus
(Fleming et al. 2006). In nature, we do not see
cheats dominate because infections that contain few
cooperators will be less productive and relatively
poor in transmission and initiating new colonies
(Brown & Johnstone 2001; Diggle 2007a; Diggle
et al. 2007b; Rumbaugh et al. 2009; see ﬁgure 2 and
discussion). However, the population structure of
pathogen populations that favours the evolution of
cooperative, virulence traits (ﬁgure 2) presents an
opportunity for the artiﬁcial introduction of social
cheats, and consequent disruption of microbial-coop-
erative virulence traits (Andre ´ & Godelle 2005).
We review the possibility of exploiting the ability of
cheater strains to invade cooperative, wild-type popu-
lations in medical intervention strategies. Firstly, the
introduction of an invasive cheat can lead to direct
reduction in parasite virulence, as well as a reduced
bacterial population size, that may make the infection
more susceptible to other intervention strategies
(Harrison et al. 2006; West et al. 2006; Diggle et al.
2007b; Kurzban & Egreth 2008; Rumbaugh et al.
2009). A second possibility is that cheats could act
as ‘Trojan horses’, vehicles for the introduction of
alleles such as sensitivity to antibiotics, into a popu-
lation that was previously antibiotic-
resistant (ﬁgure 3). Another possible use for the
Trojan horse approach would be to introduce a
lethal toxin under the control of an inducible promo-
ter, which when activated, would eliminate both
cooperators and cheats. We present a number of
heuristic models to formally illustrate the possibilities
as simply as possible.
2. POPULATION DYNAMICS
OF SOCIAL TRAITS
In this section, we show how social traits may be
exploited as part of a medical intervention strategy.
We ﬁrst focus on cooperative social traits, such as the
production of exoproducts (cooperative public
goods). In §2a we show how a cheat that does not
produce some exoproduct can invade a wild-type
population, consisting of cooperative individuals who
do produce the exoproduct. This can lead to a direct
decrease in parasite virulence (due to loss of exopro-
duct production), as well as a smaller population size
that may be more susceptible to other intervention
strategies (e.g. antibiotic treatment). In §2b we
extend this, by showing how such traits can also be
used to hitch-hike useful traits (e.g. antibiotic
vulnerabilities) into the population. In §2c we examine
the complications that can occur when within-host
populations are spatially structured, which will
reduce the ability of non-cooperative cheats to spread.
We then consider how harmful, or spiteful, social
traits may be exploited, such as anti-competitor
chemicals, bacteriocins and temperate bacteriophage
viruses. In §2d, we show that the addition of bacterio-
cin production to a cheat or Trojan horse lineage can
favour the engineered strain’s invasion, particularly
in spatially structured host compartments. We then
discuss how related forms of microbial spite involving
the production of temperate phages can generate
distinct invasion advantages to an engineered strain,
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Figure 1. Natural selection favours selﬁsh individuals who do not cooperate. Consider a population of wild-type cooperators
(‘W’) in which an uncooperative, selﬁsh cheater (‘c’) arises through mutation or migration. In a mixed population, the selﬁsh
cheater beneﬁts from the cooperative behaviour of the cooperators, without paying the cost. Consequently, the selﬁsh cheater
has a higher ﬁtness than the cooperators and spreads through the population, despite the fact that this leads to a decline in
mean ﬁtness (redrawn from Nowak 2006; West et al. 2007b). This ﬁgure illustrates the problem of cooperation—our main
aim in this paper is to discuss how this problem can be exploited for medical intervention strategies.
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(a) A cheat that does not produce
exoproducts (public goods)
Possibly, the most common form of social behaviour in
microbes is the production of exoproducts. Exopro-
ducts are manufactured by an individual, but can
then be used by the individual and its neighbours.
For example, bacteria produce numerous factors that
are released into the environment beyond the cell
membrane, such as siderophores to scavenge iron,
proteases to digest proteins and b-lactamases to inacti-
vate antibiotics (see table 1 of West et al. 2007a).
Exoproducts lead to the problem of cooperation
because they are metabolically costly to the individual
to produce but provide a beneﬁt to all the individuals
in the local group or population, as well as the individ-
ual that produced them, and hence can be thought of
as public goods (West et al. 2006). Such exoproducts
are often termed ‘virulence factors’, because their
production is linked with damage to the host, either
through some direct effect, or through facilitating
parasite growth.
We begin with a simple ecological model of within-
host competition between a cooperative, resident
wild-type lineage that produces a certain exoproduct,
and an invading cheat lineage that does not produce
the exoproduct, but can proﬁt equally from its pres-
ence within the host. Such cheats can be genetically
engineered, artiﬁcially selected for and are found in
natural populations. For illustration, we assume no
within-host population structuring—this assumption
is relaxed below. The within-host cell densities of the
wild-type and cheat are W and C, respectively, and
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Figure 2. Manipulation of natural population dynamics of social behaviour to reduce virulence of bacterial infection. The top
row of mice represents the initial population of hosts which are infected with either wild-type (W in green) or cheat (C in red)
strains of bacteria. The arrows represent transmission to new hosts, represented by the lower row of mice. (a) Illustrates the fact
that wild-type strains are more productive and better at transmission and colonization of new hosts. This promotes the main-
tenance of cooperative behaviour in the global population: even though cheats can outcompete wild-type strains within hosts,
groups containing only wild-type will be more productive and more likely to spread to new hosts (this requires that wild-
type and cheats tend to be in different hosts—high relatedness). (b) Illustrates how inoculation of hosts containing wild-type
infections with cheater strains can counteract the natural population dynamics of cooperators and cheats.
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ordinary differential equations:
dW
dt
¼ Wðð1   NÞ x þ bW=NÞ;
dC
dt
¼ Cðð1   NÞþbW=NÞ: ð2:1Þ
Here, x is the cost of exoproduct production, b the
beneﬁt (weighted by frequency of wild-type, W/N)a n d
N total population within the host (N ¼ W þ C). In
the absence of any exoproduct production (x ¼ b ¼ 0),
we have a simple pair of Lotka–Volterra competition
equations (Otto & Day 2007) with carrying capacity
and maximum growth rate normalized to 1 (and the
remaining parameters are scaled appropriately). In
contrast, a pure cooperative wild-type lineage expends
resources on enhancing both its net growth rate and
carrying capacity, given b . x (e.g. through the
secretion of shared exoproducts). Despite gains to
both growth rate and carrying capacity, a stability
analysis (Otto & Day 2007) demonstrates that a popu-
lation of pure cooperators (at carrying capacity, W* ¼
1 þ b 2x) is vulnerable to invasion by rare cheats, and
that the only stable equilibrium in model one is pure
cheats, at C* ¼ 1 and extinction of the wild-type,
W* ¼ 0 (see also Andre ´ & Godelle 2005). From a
therapeutic perspective, the replacement of W by C
leads to a reduction of bacterial density, and
potentially more signiﬁcantly, the cessation of coopera-
tive virulence factor production (ﬁgure 4a). This
predicted invasion of cheats, with a subsequent
reduction of virulence has been observed with QS of
cheats in the bacterium P . aeruginosa when infecting
mice (Rumbaugh et al. 2009).
(b) Trojan horse cheats
The ability of a cheat lineage to invade a patch (i.e. a
host) of cooperators opens the potential for hitch-
hiking useful traits (e.g. antibiotic vulnerabilities)
along with the socially dominant cheat strategy into
the microbial pathogen population—a Trojan horse
cheat. This is analogous in some ways to the suggestion
that selﬁsh genetic elements can be used to genetically
engineer natural populations (Turelli & Hoffman 1999;
Burt2003).Wemodifyourabovemodelbyinserting an
engineered vulnerability into the cheat lineage, impos-
ing a direct growth cost q (if the engineered trait
provides a direct growth beneﬁt, this would be
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Figure 3. Introducing antibiotic resistance with a Trojan horse approach. (a) This panel shows a host infected with wild-type
strains (W in green) inoculated with a strain of cheats (C in red) that are able to invade and outcompete the wild-type infection.
The resulting population of bacteria is less virulent, less productive and more vulnerable to eradication by the host’s immune
system. However, this cheat strain (C) is still resistant to antibiotics. (b) This panel represents a host inoculated with a cheater
strain (T in red) that has also been genetically engineered to have antibiotic sensitivity restored, allowing the infection to be
eradicated by antibiotic treatment. We have called this kind of strain a Trojan horse cheat: host ¼ Troy; cheat ¼ wooden
horse; antibiotic sensitive gene ¼ Greeks. This representation shows the best possible outcome: in all likelihood, the cheats
will not completely eradicate the wild-type cells and so, following antibiotic treatment, the resistant population could recover.
Even if resistant strains survive, the infective population may be reduced to levels that can be eradicated by immune system of
the host and there is theoretically no limit to the number of times antibiotic-sensitive strains could be inoculated.
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dW
dt
¼ Wðð1   NÞ x þ bW=NÞ;
dT
dt
¼ Tðð1   NÞ q þ bW=NÞ: ð2:2Þ
In the case of an engineered susceptibility to a
speciﬁc antibiotic treatment, it is important to delay
use of the antibiotic treatment until the Trojan horse
cheat has established within the host, otherwise the
costs imposed on the Trojan horse cheat by the anti-
biotic would overwhelm the gains via social cheating,
and the Trojan horse would fail to invade. While any
remaining wild-type are likely to enjoy a competitive
advantage once the Trojan horse controlling antibiotic
is administered, at this point the wild-type is reduced
in density following the earlier Trojan horse invasion.
This reduction in parasite density could aid any
other intervention strategy, emphasizing that such
Trojan horse cheats could be useful as part of a
larger strategy.
An alternate class of Trojan horse traits could bring
more immediate therapeutic advantages to Trojan
horse invasion, if the Trojan horse directly sows the
seeds of destruction for both the wild-type and itself.
For example, a Trojan horse lineage engineered to
produce an antimicrobial toxin that kills when at sufﬁ-
cient density (i.e. the toxin is under QS-dependent
regulation), both W and T. In this case, the Trojan
horse lineage generates a socially mediated cost,
proportionate to its population share (T/N), thus
when the Trojan horse is initially rare, it can largely
escape this social cost, and still invade. Alternatively,
a Trojan horse could be engineered to produce an
antimicrobial toxin upon addition of a certain chemi-
cal. In this case, a toxin gene would be placed under
the control of an inducible promoter and only acti-
vated when the promoter is activated by the inducer
chemical. In this case it would be advantageous to
allow the Trojan horse to signiﬁcantly invade the
population before activating its deadly cargo. Weighing
the socially mediated cost by a, in the case of a
constitutive toxin-producer, we have
dW
dt
¼ Wðð1   NÞ x þ bW=N   aT=NÞ;
dT
dt
¼ Tðð1   NÞ q þ bW=N   aT=NÞ: ð2:3Þ
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Figure 4. Invasion of cheats and Trojan horses into an established resident infection and consequent virulence (model 4). Black
lines, wild-type (W). Blue lines, cheats or Trojan horses (C or T). Dotted lines, virulence (a weighted sum of wild-type and
cheat density). (a,c,e) No within-host spatial structure (r ¼ 0). (b,d,f ) Limited within-host spatial structure (r ¼ 0.3). (a,b)
Cheats versus wild-type (model 4 with a ¼ q ¼ 0); virulence is a weighted combination of the two lineage densities, here viru-
lence equals 2W þ C.( c,d) Trojan horse cheats versus wild-type (model 4 with a ¼ 0.5, q ¼ 0.01), virulence equals 2W þ T.
(e,f ) Trojan horse cooperators versus wild-type (model 4 with a ¼ 20.3, q ¼ 0.01), virulence equals 2WþT. Other
parameters: x ¼ 0.1, b ¼ 0.2. Initial densities: W(0) ¼ 1.1, C(0) ¼ 0.001, T(0) ¼ 0.001.
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tition is entirely deﬁned by the relative magnitudes of
the direct effects x and q.I fx . q (if the cost of
wild-type cooperation is greater than the cost of the
Trojan horse engineered vulnerability), then the cheat
lineage will again invade and dominate within the
host (tending to a carrying capacity of T* ¼ 1 2 q 2 a;
ﬁgure 4c) driving the wild-type to extinction, otherwise
the cheat will fail to invade.
The Trojan horse cheat offers potentially multiple
therapeutic gains. Given a ¼ 0 (equation (2.2)),
Trojan horse invasion leads to a reduction of total
bacterial density (tending to T* ¼ 1 2 q,f r o mW* ¼
1 þ b 2 x), the loss of virulence factor production
associated with wild-type cooperation, and the ﬁxation
of an engineered vulnerability (e.g. antibiotic suscepti-
bility) within the bacterial population (ﬁgure 4a). The
generation of a socially mediated cost by the Trojan
horse lineage (a . 0; equation (2.3)) offers the
additional beneﬁt of further depressing the remaining
Trojan horse bacterial lineage (ﬁgure 4c), potentially
to extinction (if a . 1 2 q).
(c) Trojan horse cheat in a spatially
structured host
The above model is very favourable to our basic argu-
ment, as cheats that produce no or less exoproducts
can readily invade an unstructured population of
cooperators (e.g. Grifﬁn et al. 2004; Brockhurst et al.
2007; Diggle et al. 2007b; Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007;
Sandoz et al. 2007; Ku ¨mmerli et al. 2009a,b).
However, while unstructured populations occur in
shaken laboratory cultures, infections in hosts are
likely to be spatially structured (Rumbaugh et al.
2009). In order to consider the additional challenge
of cheat invasion into a spatially structured host,
we assume that within-host interactions are
non-random. Speciﬁcally, we assume that individual
pathogens interact with their kin with probability r,
and otherwise interact with individuals drawn at
random from the entire within-host population (e.g.
Ross-Gillespie et al. 2007), yielding
dW
dt
¼ Wðð1   NÞ x þ bWw   aTwÞ;
dT
dt
¼ Tðð1   NÞ q þ bWt   aTtÞ; ð2:4Þ
where Ww and Tw refer to the average local density of
Wand T, in the neighbourhood of a wild-type, and Wt
and Tt refer to the average local density of Wand T,i n
the neighbourhood of a Trojan horse. Speciﬁcally, we
have Ww ¼ r þ (1 2 r) W/N; Wt ¼ (1 2 r) W/N; Tw ¼
(1 2 r)T/N and Tt ¼ r þ (1 2 r)T/N.W h e nr ¼ 0, we
recover the well-mixed model 1, with Ww ¼ Wt ¼
W/N and Tw ¼ Tt ¼ T/N, and when r ¼ 1w eh a v e
complete separation of the strains, with Ww ¼ Tt ¼ 1
and Tw ¼ Wt ¼ 0. Note the demographic term
(1 2 N) remains global (unmodiﬁed by r), reﬂecting
constraints on the remaining ‘host space’. We can
interpret N in the spatial model as the proportion of
distinct potential infection sites within a host that are
infected, and r as a measure of within-site relatedness
(where social interactions take place).
When a ¼ q ¼ 0, we recover a structured version of
equation (2.1), wild-type versus cheats C. Given sufﬁ-
ciently low r, the sole stable equilibrium remains pure
C (with W* ¼ 0), however if rb . x (cf. Hamilton’s
Rule (Hamilton 1963, 1964)); then pure W (at
W* ¼ 1 þ b 2 x) becomes the sole attractor, highlight-
ing a standard result of social evolution theory that
spatial structure promotes cooperation (ﬁgure 4b illus-
trates an intermediate case, where limited within-host
structuring slows invasion of the cheat; reviewed by
West et al. 2002; Lehmann & Keller 2006). Given
that this result runs counter to our goal of developing
a therapeutic cheat agent, how can we proceed?
Turning to the full Trojan horse model (equation
(2.4)), we see that the condition for wild-type vulner-
ability to invasion (and for Trojan horse stability)
becomes r(b þ a) , x2q, again favoured by low
within-host structure r. The Trojan horse cheat’s
invasive ability is further weakened by its direct costs
q, and also any socially mediated costs a, as these
costs are now more heavily felt by the invasive Trojan
horse lineage (ﬁgure 4d).
Hamilton’s rule also shows how ‘ultra-cooperators’
could theoretically be used to invade a population,
although this is unlikely to be a practical option. If
the Trojan horse delivers sufﬁcient social beneﬁts (i.e.
if 2a . b, the Trojan horse is more cooperative than
the wild-type), then increasing population structure r
will favour invasion of the Trojan horse lineage. In
this scenario, we have a negative a (for example the
Trojan horse produces a growth-enhancing exopro-
duct) and the Trojan horse would lead to an increase
in the within-host microbial density (from W* ¼ 1 þ
b 2 x to T* ¼ 1 2 a 2 q and W* ¼ 0; ﬁgure 4e,f ),
but the remaining therapeutic gains would still stand:
loss of virulence factor production (extinction of the
wild-type strain), ﬁxation of engineered vulnerability
(e.g. antibiotic sensitivity). If a is negative, the
Trojan horse becomes a cooperative lineage and
therefore we are exploring a reversal of our original
premise, here proposing a cooperator to invade a
structured social population, and consequently we
ﬁnd that increasing within-host structure enhances
the invisibility of the Trojan horse cooperator
(ﬁgure 4e,f ). While this demonstrates the theoretical
plausibility of using an ultra-cooperator to invade a
structured population (of cooperators), we note that
there are likely to be practical problems that make
this much less useful than the scenario of a cheat
invading. In particular, natural selection is likely to
have led to the wild-type producing exoproducts at a
rate that cannot be invaded (i.e. if greater cooperation
was favoured, then lineages would already be doing it),
or it may be hard to genetically engineer such
cooperators.
(d) Bacteriocinogen cheat invasion
The above models have considered the invasion of
individuals that differ in their rate of production of a
cooperative exoproduct. Another possibility is to
exploit a different type of social trait—the pro-
duction of anti-competitor chemicals or bacteriocins
(Riley & Gordon 1999; Riley & Wertz 2002).
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traits. First, they carry genes coding for a small peptide
anti-competitor toxin, a bacteriocin. Second, they
carry genes conferring immunity to this bacteriocin,
ensuring that the toxicity is experienced preferentially
by non-kin.
A broad strand of experimental and theoretical
work on the ecology of bacteriocin-mediated compe-
tition highlights the importance of spatial structure
in mediating the outcome of competition, with the
consensus recognizing that structured environments
promote the invasion of rare killers by increasing the
local density of chemical weapons to an effective
dose (Chao & Levin 1981; Levin 1988; Frank 1994;
Durrett & Levin 1997; Gordon & Riley 1999; Gardner
et al. 2004). Gardner et al. (2004) go on to illustrate
that the production of anti-competitor chemical
weapons can be understood as an example of microbial
spite. A spiteful trait imposes costs on both actor and
recipient, and is favoured when it is preferentially
directed at non-relatives, because this has the indirect
beneﬁt of freeing-up resources for relatives (Hamilton
1970; Lehmann et al. 2006; Gardner et al. 2007a).
Bacteriocin production can be considered a spiteful
trait as it has a negative ﬁtness impact on the actor
cell producing the toxin (suicidal cell lysis to release
the toxins), imposes a clear cost on recipient cells that
are sensitive to the action of the toxin, while freeing-
up resources for resistant relatives (Gardner & West
2004; Gardner et al.2 0 0 4 ; Inglis et al.2 0 0 9 ). Note
that the indirect beneﬁt of freeing-up resources is
greatest when populations are structured, with local
competition for resources.
Webeginwithanon-spatialtreatmentofcompetition
between a bacteriocinogenic cheat and wild-type.
Consider a cheat lineage B that is also bacteriocino-
genic, producing (at a cost q) an anti-wild-type
compoundwithefﬁcacye(scaledbydensityofbacterio-
cinogen, B/N). In a well-mixed host, we have
wild-type:
dW
dt
¼ Wðð1   NÞ x þ bW=N   eB=NÞ;
bacteriocinogen cheat:
dB
dt
¼ Bðð1   NÞ q þ bW=NÞ: ð2:5Þ
We again assume b . x (investment in public goods
increases carrying capacity) and additionally that e . q
(investment in bacteriocin gives relative advantage
when dominant). Note when x ¼ b ¼ 0 (no public
goods interaction), we recover classic bacteriocin-
mediated competition models with frequency
threshold to invasion at B/N ¼ q/e (Frank 1994;
Durrett & Levin 1997; Brown et al. 2006). A stability
analysis illustrates that pure wild-type is locally stable
(at W* ¼ 1 þ b 2 x)i fq . x (i.e. if bacteriocin is
expensive relative to public good of W lineage). Pure
cheat B is stable (at B* ¼ 1 2 q)i fx þ e . q (killing
compensates for costs) and q , 1( B* is sustainable).
Note that if x þ e . q . x, then both pure equilibria
are stable (bistability, with threshold deﬁned by
unstable equilibrium {W*, B*}, where B*/N* ¼
(q2x)/e). Note that this threshold frequency of inva-
ders (q 2 x)/e simpliﬁes to the classic threshold
frequency of q/e when x ¼ 0. Increasing x (increasing
the additional cheat beneﬁt to B) decreases the
threshold to disappearance when x . q: i.e. given a
sufﬁcient cheating advantage, the rarity threshold to
bacteriocin-mediated invasion can be overcome (i.e.
the cheating and spiteful traits interact synergistically,
see also Brown & Taylor submitted).
Figure 5a,b illustrates the frequency-dependent
fate of bacteriocinogen invasion when the invading B
lineage pays a signiﬁcant direct cost, q . x (e.g. B
carries a costly Trojan horse trait. A similar and classic
result would hold for the case where B and Ware iden-
tical with respect to their public goods provision). In
this particular illustration, the unstable equilibrium is
at B*/N ¼ 0.1; below this frequency, invasion fails
(ﬁgure 5a), above this frequency the invader domi-
nates (ﬁgure 5b). In contrast, ﬁgure 5c,d illustrates
the more favourable case, where the direct costs to
the bacteriocinogenic lineage are small (q , x), and
consequently the killer lineage can invade from any
frequency. Figure 5 illustrates that modifying multiple
social traits in conjunction (here, public goods
and bacteriocin production) can generate more
favourable outcomes (here, invasion from rare due to
public goods cheating, and accelerating exclusion of
wild-type due bacteriocin production).
Modelling structured within-host (or within-patch)
ecological dynamics of bacteriocin-mediated compe-
tition is more complex than the previous structured
social interactions in §2c, and is usually addressed via
simulations (Frank 1994; Durrett & Levin 1997;
Cza ´ra ´n et al. 2002) or a heuristic approach (Gardner
et al. 2004). Across these models we ﬁnd consensus
with the experimental ﬁndings that spatial structuring
allows bacteriocinogen invasion from rare (Chao &
Levin 1981). The effect of spatial structuring on the
invisibility of a cooperative wild-type by a bacterioci-
nogenic cheat remains an open question. On the one
hand, invasibility via bacteriocin production will be
enhanced by spatial structuring (see above), while on
the other hand, invasibility via social cheating will be
reduced by within-host structuring (ﬁgure 4a,b).
It is worth noting that there are other mechanisms
of microbial spite, with qualitatively different invasion
dynamics (Brown et al. 2009), which could be
engineered into a Trojan horse therapeutic strain. In
particular, a strategy of coupling a Trojan horse with
a temperate phages may offer signiﬁcant advantages
for the invasion of unstructured foci of infection
(Brown et al. 2006). Temperate phages are viruses of
bacteria that can be transmitted either vertically or
horizontally. Infection of susceptible bacteria by tem-
perate phages can result in two possible outcomes;
the most common is the lytic cycle (rapid host lysis
and production of numerous horizontally transmissi-
ble viral particles). Very rarely, however, the phage
can lysogenize the host, persisting in a dormant state
while allowing the survival of the infected bacteria.
This dormant phage is then replicated with the
bacterial genome, and thus vertically transmitted
upon bacterial division. Furthermore, this vertically
transmitted carried-phage provides immunity to its
Review. Trojan horse S. P. Brown et al. 3163
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)carrier-bacteria against further horizontal infection by
this phage (Adams 1959; Campbell 1996). Upon rare
spontaneous induction of the carried-phage, viral pro-
geny are released through host lysis.
Temperate phages have been demonstrated to func-
tion analogously to bacteriocins (Bossi et al. 2003;
Brown et al. 2006; Joo et al. 2006), by differentially
killing susceptible (non-lysogen) bacteria. Brown
et al. (2006) further demonstrated experimentally
that unlike bacteriocinogenic lineages (see above),
lysogenic bacteria can invade rapidly from rare into
unstructured environments, due to the ability of the
released phage to amplify on susceptibles. Here, we
consider the fate of a candidate theraputic cheat line-
age, that carries an additional temperate phage
weapon that is active against the target resident
bacteria. We begin with a simple non-spatial treatment
tracking the densities of wild-type W, lysogen cheat C
and free viral propagules V,
dW
dt
¼ Wðð1   NÞ x þ bW=N   aVÞ;
dC
dt
¼ Cðð1   NÞ q þ bW=NÞ;
dV
dt
¼ yqC þ yaWV   aVN: ð2:6Þ
Following Brown et al. (2006), we ﬁnd that pure
wild-type is always unstable (so long as burst size y is
greater than 1), and that pure C and V are stable if
q , 1 and y . 1, therefore we have a simple general
outcome in the non-spatial case of extinction of the
wild-type W, irrespective of the social behaviour
(governed by x and b) of the resident wild-type.
Understanding how microbial competition mediated
by temperate phage is modiﬁed by within-host spatial
structure is an open question, however it is likely that
in contrast to the bacteriocin case, spatial structuring
will act to dampen invasion by slowing the viral
epidemic, due to the separation of susceptibles from
free virus.
3. DISCUSSION
We have applied social evolution theory to suggest
novel intervention strategies in the treatment of bac-
terial infection: (i) the introduction of an invasive
cheat that does not contribute to the production of a
virulence factor can lead to a reduction in parasite
virulence, as well as a reduced bacterial population
size, that may make the infection more susceptible to
other intervention strategies (§2a, ﬁgure 2); (ii) cheats
could be used as Trojan horses to introduce useful
traits such as antibiotic sensitivity into the population
(§2b, ﬁgure 3); (iii) social dominance by a more
benign and controllable microbe could be achieved by
harnessing allelopathic traits to the therapeutic strain,
that are active against the resident pathogen (e.g. bac-
teriocins, temperate phages; §2d,e). These different
possibilities may interact synergistically (e.g. a bacterio-
cin-producing cheat), or with other strategies in a larger
intervention plan (see also Brown & Taylor submitted).
We have used a few simple examples to illustrate the
general points, and there are a range of other social
behaviours that could be exploited, including lower
levels of persistence (Gardner et al.2 0 0 7 b), cell
death (Ackermann et al. 2008) as well as cheats defec-
tive in multiple social traits. Furthermore, this approach
could also be useful in other areas such as industry (e.g.
problems with bioﬁlms) or agriculture (e.g. treating
plant pathogens).
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Figure 5. Invasion of bacteriocinogen cheats into an established resident infection and consequent virulence (equation (2.5)).
Black lines, wild-type (W). Blue lines, bacteriocinogenic (B). Dotted lines, virulence (a weighted sum of wild-type and cheat
density). (a,b) Bacteriocinogen has higher direct costs (x ¼ 0.1, q ¼ 0.15). (c,d) Bacteriocinogen has lower direct costs, and is
an effective social cheat (x ¼ 0.1, q ¼ 0.05). (a,c) Bacteriocinogen is initially rare (W(0) ¼ 1.1, B(0) ¼ 0.001). (b,d)
Bacteriocinogen is initially more common (W(0) ¼ 1.1, B(0) ¼ 0.13). Virulence ¼ 2W þ T. Other parameters: b ¼ 0.2; e ¼ 0.5.
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have advantages and disadvantages, which should be
considered for speciﬁc cases (table 1). Invasion of an
exoproduct cheat is more likely when microbial popu-
lations are relatively unstructured within-hosts (§2c)
where the exoproduct diffuses over larger distances
(lower r), and when the cost of exoproduct production
is high (higher x). Note that the degree of within-host
structuring can be temporarily reduced to favour cheat
invasion through the use of a sufﬁciently diffuse mech-
anism of inoculation, for example using an aerosol
spray. As the invasion of cheats proceeds, within-host
structuring is liable to increase (with cheats and
cooperators increasingly segregated in distinct foci),
however, by this time a signiﬁcant theraputic gain in
overall virulence factor reduction may have been
achieved. A potential complication is that some
exoproducts show speciﬁcity in their uptake: different
strains of P . aeruginosa produce different forms of
pyoverdine, and strains are best able to take up their
form of pyoverdine (Meyer et al. 1997; Smith et al.
2005). Exoproducts that did not involve such speci-
ﬁcity (e.g. proteases) would be more useful, because
it would not be necessary to match the ‘type’ of the
cheat and the cooperator that they are to invade.
Another complication that we have not considered is
that the genes for many social traits can be on plasmids
that are horizontally transmitted between cells (Smith
2001). For example, one of the most virulent strains of
bacteria to be reported recently is the strain of MRSA
USA300, in which the gene responsible for antibiotic
resistance is located on a horizontally transmissible
plasmid. Plasmids may represent another avenue for
the Trojan horse approach.
Given that cheats producing less or no exoproducts
can invade infections, why are cheats not more
common in natural infections? It is important here to
distinguish between within-host and between-host
(patch) dynamics (Ku ¨mmerli et al. 2009a). Within
hosts, cheats can potentially invade (Rumbaugh et al.
2009). However, this leads to reduced bacterial
growth (Rumbaugh et al. 2009) and hence a lower
transmission to future hosts—transmission success
will depend on the proportion of cooperator cells in
an infection (ﬁgure 2). The overall balance of these
two opposing forces will depend upon the extent to
which cheats and cooperators can occur in the host
(Brown et al. 2002; West & Buckling 2003; West
et al. 2006). If the population dynamics lead to
mixed infections with both types (high strain diversity
within hosts), then within-host dynamics will favour
cheats. In contrast, if infections tend to be only
cheats or cooperators (low strain diversity within
hosts), then the between-host dynamics will favour
cooperators. These two conditions correspond to relat-
edness being relatively low or high, respectively, and
are another way of conceptualizing the familiar result
that altruistic cooperation is favoured by high related-
ness (Hamilton 1964). Even when natural population
dynamics lead to high relatedness that favours coop-
erative virulence traits, it is still possible that a cheat
could invade. In chronic infections, where there is a
relatively low level of transmission between hosts, we
predict that cheater strains could invade in natural
populations. There is some evidence to support this
prediction: bioﬁlm formation is relatively poor in
strains from older infections (Lee et al. 2005) and
mutations occurring post-colonization are found in
genes controlling social behaviours, such as public
good production and QS (Smith et al. 2006). The
introduction of cheats into these infections may be
less effective in the ways described in this paper, as
there may not be a sufﬁcient amount of cooperation
going on in the infective population for the introduced
cheats to exploit. Another general point is that we
assume throughout that the mechanics of host exploi-
tation are inherently cooperative, and therefore, that
the introduction of cheats will reduce virulence. For
pathogens that do not engage in cooperative virulence
mechanisms, social cheats are predicted to be more
virulent (Frank 1996) and our theraputic approach
would not work.
With any new class of anti-infective therapy, it is
essential to consider the potential risk of resistance
evolution—see discussions of phage therapy (Levin &
Bull 2004) and antimicrobial peptides (Bell &
Gouyon 2003; Perron et al. 2006). Andre ´ & Godelle
(2005) have also argued that by attacking social traits
directly (for example, by disrupting QS regulation),
the selective pressure driving the emergence of resist-
ance traits to social perturbations can be dramatically
reduced relative to classic antimicrobials, because it
is hard for rare cooperators to invade populations of
cheaters. Selection will be unlikely to favour the restor-
ation of cooperative function in individuals that have
evolved resistance to cheats. While the same argument
holds for our particular brand of social perturbation,
the emergence of resistance is still conceivable.
Natural anti-cheat resistance traits are widespread,
for example mechanisms of speciﬁcity (discussed
above) effectively remove cheats from the pool of
shared goodies produced by a focal cooperative
Table 1. A classiﬁcation of social strategies by their
conjectured strengths.
strategy favoured by
cheat unstructured populations, more highly
diffusible exoproducts, more costly
exoproducts, lower speciﬁcity in
exoproduct uptake
Trojan horse
cheat
as above, and with low cost or high
beneﬁt associated with Trojan horse
trait
Trojan horse
cooperator
structured populations, less diffusible
exoproducts, less costly exoproducts,
higher speciﬁcity in exoproduct
uptake
bacteriocin cheat structured populations (if low cheat
advantage), more diffusible
bacteriocins, higher speciﬁcity in
bacteriocin immunity, low cost or
high beneﬁt associated with any
Trojan horse trait
lysogen cheat unstructured populations, durable
phage propagules, low cost or high
beneﬁt associated with any Trojan
horse trait
Review. Trojan horse S. P. Brown et al. 3165
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2009)lineage. For lineages without inbuilt mechanisms of
cheater resistance (most likely reﬂecting a transmission
ecology characterized by high bottlenecking and con-
sequently a dominance of single-genotype infections),
we anticipate the greatest initial success for our strat-
egy, and also the greatest long-term risk of resistance
evolution.
Another point of departure from classic chemical
mechanisms of microbial control concerns the
within-host dynamics of our control agent. In this
regard, our proposed cheat therapy most closely
resembles phage therapy, where a live natural enemy
is administered to control an infection (rather than a
live social parasite). In both cases, the control agent
is able, in principle, to replicate at the site of interest,
within infection, therefore offering signiﬁcant gains
over a chemical agent that must be introduced en
masse, often at damagingly high doses, at a remote
site of entry. However, the slow development of
phage therapy over many decades offers further notes
of caution (Levin & Bull 2004): replication of the
control agent may only be possible under certain
physiological states of both resident and control
agent, and the ability of the control agent to reach
infection sites (the ‘pharmacokinetics’ of social
parasites) may be severely limited, relative to classic
chemical control agents (although see Rumbaugh
et al. 2009). A further cause for advantage—and
cause for concern—shared by phage and social para-
site therapy is the potential ability of the control
agent to co-evolve with its target, potentially prolong-
ing efﬁcacy, but also raising the spectre of unintended
consequences.
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